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THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES
SECURITIES REGUIATION: AN ESSAY ON
REGULATION IN AN AGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY
JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST
I have accepted an invitation to predict the regulatory future
of securities markets in the United States. My acceptance is
foolish for so many different reasons that I despair of counting
them all. I therefore draw attention to two of the predictions I
am about to offer and trust that the reader will overlook all the
others. My first prediction is that my predictions will be proven
wrong. My second is that having this essay appear in print is a
big mistake. A printed essay creates an irrefutable record that
will memorialize the stunning accuracy of my first prediction.
On the brighter side, the record will then reflect that I knew that
I had no chance of getting it right.
So why even embark on a mission doomed to failure? The
reason is simple. There is no other responsible choice. The
quality of the securities regulation regime in the United States
over the coming decade hinges more critically on the ability of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to understand
dramatic technological change than on any other single factor.
The securities industry is, in many essential respects, an
information processing industry.1  In today's world, no
competitive enterprise or regulatory agency involved in the
information processing industry can develop a coherent strategy
for addressing rapid technological change absent a sophisticated
t William A. Franke Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School;
Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (1985-1990). I would like
to thank Mr. Joseph Palmer, a third year law student at Stanford Law School, for
his excellent research assistance.
1 See Third Report on the Readiness of the United States Securities Industry
and Public Companies to Meet the Information Processing Challenges of the Year
2000 (July 1999) (explaining that the securities industry "relies heavily on
computerized information processing technology"), at http://wvw.sec.gov/news/
studies/yr2000-3.htm.
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appreciation of the current state of the technology.2 That
appreciation must be supplemented by a nuanced view of how
technology is likely to evolve in the future. A coherent and
policy-relevant set of predictions as to the future course of
technological development is essential to such a nuanced view.
Indeed, absent a carefully crafted set of predictions, the
agency is bereft of any articulated expectations as to how
technology is likely to impact the agency's business. Predictions
of the future technological evolution of U.S. securities markets-
combined with a sense of humility about the accuracy of those
predictions-are therefore essential for prudent regulatory
planning and action. We should be under no delusion that these
predictions will be precisely accurate, but we should also be
under no delusion about the need to engage in the effort to make
these predictions.
Put another way, the SEC needs a technology strategy. It
cannot develop a technology strategy without having an opinion
(that is, a set of predictions or expectations) about the future
evolution of technology and its implications for securities
markets. A technology strategy need not, and should not, take
the form of a fixed plan. Instead, a technology strategy is far
better articulated through a flexible and evolutionary set of
policies that recognize the difficulties of predicting future
technological developments. Ideally, the strategy would respect
natural technological and market forces, and recognize that the
private sector is far better at innovation than the federal
government. 3 Respect for the private sector's leadership role in
2 For discussions regarding the growing influence of corporate officers with
technological expertise (chief technology officers (CTOs) and chief information
officers (CIOs)), see Ed Scannell, CTO's Steer Ebusiness Course, INFOWORLD,
November 15, 1999, at 44 ("[T]he balance of power for spearheading technical
development is gently, but steadily, shifting to Chief Technology Officers."),
available at http://archive.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayArchive.pl/99/46/tO1-46.44.
44.htm; CIO's See a Future in the Chief Exec's Job, COMPUTERWORLD, August 3,
2000 (predicting that many future CEO's will come from the ranks of CIO's because
of increasing business importance of technological knowledge); Susan E. Fisher,
Web Redefines Role of CTO, INFOWORLD, Nov. 29, 1999, at 100 (describing the
growing demand for "individuals who can guide their companies' technology
strategy with an eye on business goals"), available at http://www2.infoworld.com/
articlesca/xml/99/11129/991129cacto.xml.
3 See Jim Fisher-Thompson, Information Technology is Best Spurred by Private
Sector, U.S. Official Says, U. S. Dep't of State International Information Programs
(Oct. 2, 2000) (quoting Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and
Agricultural Affairs Alan Larson that development of information technology "is
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technology does not, however, mean that the agency should
forego carefully selected opportunities to stimulate technological
progress through the adoption of suitably tailored "technology-
forcing" strategies.
This call for a technology strategy should not be
misinterpreted as a criticism of the SEC's approach to technology
to date. The SEC has done a far better job of adapting to the
Internet age than the vast majority of government agencies, 4 and
deserves credit for its accomplishments. Nonetheless, the pace
of technological change over the coming years is likely to gain
speed and technology's implications for the future of the nation's
securities markets will only become more fundamental. 5
In furtherance of this call for an articulated, flexible, and
evolutionary technology strategy for the SEC, this essay
proceeds through four distinct sections. Section I expands on my
prediction that a deeper appreciation of technology is perhaps
the single most important factor that will drive the agency's
success or failure in the coming decade. Section II describes four
distinct regulatory approaches to technology: agencies can be
technology forcing, proactive, reactive, or obstructionist. In
Section III, I contend that the SEC has done a far better job than
most other agencies in responding to technological change, but
being driven by the private sector), at http'/wv.usinfo.state.gov/topicallglobal/
econ]00100203.htm.
4 For a general discussion of federal agencies' adaptation to the Internet, see
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT No. AIMD/GGD-00-179, ELECTRONIC
GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL INITIATIVES ARE EVOLVING RAPIDLY BUT THEY FACE
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES, May 22, 2000; David L. McClure, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT No. AIMD-00-282 B-286007, ELECTRONIC
GOVERNMENT: GOVERNMENT PAPERWORK ELIMINATION ACT PRESENTS
CHALLENGES FOR AGENCIES. For a discussion of recent efforts to harmonize federal
agencies' internet strategies through a central government portal, see Electronic
Government: Opportunities and Challenges Facing the FirstGov Web Gateway:
Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 2, 2000)
(statement of David L. McClure, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, General Accounting Office).
5 See Restructuring is a Must to Survive the Global IT Boom, WALL STREET &
TECHNOLOGY, Apr. 1, 2000, at 8 (explaining that "[tihe securities industry will have
to undergo significant restructuring to survive current and future waves of global
information technology changes"); Ivy Schmerken, The Big Board Pushes Wireless to
End the Paper Trail, WALL STREET & TECHNOLOGY, Dec. 15, 2000; Edward J.
Nicoll, Online Technology Changes the Game, SECURITIES INDUSTRY ONLINE (June
28, 1999), available at http://www.securitiesindustry.com.
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that it has been far from perfect. EDGAR6 serves as an example
of a bold innovation that, today, stands as a legacy system that
impedes technological progress. EDGAR is thus an example of
how, at different times and with respect to a single initiative, the
SEC has morphed from using a technology-forcing strategy to
relying on a reactive or obstructionist strategy. In Section IV, I
climb way out on several limbs by describing five distinct
technological developments, and by predicting how those
developments might evolve in a manner that implicates the
regulatory regime. Unchastened by the audacity of this
enterprise, I also propose a range of regulatory strategies to
address each technological challenge or opportunity. Section V
collects some concluding observations.
To summarize those five developments, and to whet the
reader's appetite (or to save the reader the trouble of proceeding
any further-take your pick), the topics I explore and
suggestions I make are as follows:
EDGAR is a legacy system. It can be replaced with an open
architecture model that allows for internet-based, competitive,
instantaneous, and equitable disclosure of filed materials. This
policy change could save taxpayers millions of dollars, and
significantly improve the quality of the review and disclosure
process.
The SEC should take a strong leadership role in the
development of financial and accounting XML.7 That technology
6 According to the SEC:
EDGAR, the Electronics Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system,
performs automated collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and
forwarding of submissions by companies and others who are required by
law to file forms with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ....
Its primary purpose is to increase the efficiency and fairness of the
securities market for the benefit of investors, corporations, and the
economy by accelerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and
analysis of time-sensitive corporate information filed with the agency.
Important Information About Edgar, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, at
http'J/www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm; John Penhollow, EDGAR, 960 PLICORP.
33 (1996) (discussing the history of EDGAR).
7 Norman Walsh describes XML on XML.com as follows:
XML is a markup language for documents containing structured
information. Structured information contains both content (words,
pictures, etc.) and some indication of what role that content plays (for
example, content in a section heading has a different meaning from
content in a footnote, which means something different than content in a
figure caption or content in a database table, etc.). Almost all documents
have some structure. A markup language is a mechanism to identify
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can help resolve a host of serious accounting and disclosure
issues that cannot be addressed with today's "one-size-fits-all"
accounting regime.
The agency should adopt an open-architecture "peer-to-peer"
strategy (also described as an open API-structure) to address the
fragmentation and competition concerns that are raised by the
Electronic Communications Networks ("ECN") revolution8 and
other new trading technologies.
A host of technological tools can be readily adapted to
resolve emerging concerns regarding suitability in the electronic
brokerage space. These solutions need not trigger a battle over
whether e-brokers are engaged in making recommendations.
The SEC and the self-regulatory organizations ("SRO's")9
can be far more helpful in fostering the use of authentication
technologies to help deter counterfeit disclosures over the
Internet that rely on the ability to "spoof' an authentic source,
such as the disclosures that influenced Emulex, Lucent, and
Pairgain stock prices.10
These five examples hardly cover all the bases when it
comes to developing an evolutionary technology strategy. They
do, however, illustrate some of the key issues that will have to be
structures in a document. The XML specification defines a standard way to
add markup to documents.
Norman Walsh, A Technical Introduction to X"L (Oct. 3, 1998), at http://www.xml.
com/pub/a/98/10/ guideO.html); see also infra note 37.
8 The past three years has seen the development of nine major Electronic
Communications Networks, which handle an estimated 34% of NASDAQ volume
and 3% to 4% of trading on the New York Stock Exchange. See Deborah Radcliff,
Trading Nets Give Exchanges A Run for Their Money, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 18,
2000, at 20.
9 See Elizabeth I. Sanchez, SEC Rejects Bid to Fully Relinquish Authority Over
Pre-need Firms, BUSINESSWORLD, Nov. 20, 2000, at 15 (quoting SEC chairperson
Lilia Bautista that self-regulatory organization status "is a privilege granted to
institutions to be able to formulate their own policies and monitor the activities of
their members").
10 Shares of Emulex fell 60% in August 2000 after dissemination of a
counterfeit online company press release containing damaging information about
the company. See Terzah Ewing et al., Bogus Report Sends Emulex On a Wild Ride,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2000, at C1. Stock of Lucent Technologies fell 5% after a dozen
false postings were made to an Internet discussion board. See David Leinweber, The
Internet and Financial Markets: Democracy or Anarchy?, SECURITIES WK., Nov. 6,
2000, at 8. A former employee of Pairgain Technologies directed bulletin board
visitors to a false Bloomberg report that sent the stock price up 31%. See Kevin A.
O'Brien, The Fight Against Cyber-crime, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV., Dec. 1, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 11960958.
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addressed by the SEC in the coming years as technology
evolves to create new opportunities and challenges.
I. TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES REGULATION
Financial markets are more susceptible to technological
change than virtually any other major market in the world. The
logic in support of this proposition is straightforward, and recent
experience amply supports this prognostication."
The pace of technological change is fastest in the
information technology sector. Whether we are talking about
broadband, MIPS 2, or cost of storage, the trajectory is in a single
direction: better, faster, cheaper, sooner. At root, the financial
securities industry is nothing more than a vertical application of
the information technology industry. As applied to the financial
services industry, the trends toward better, faster, cheaper,
sooner are so powerful that they have revolutionized the
industry in a relatively short period of time, and there is every
reason to believe that this pace of change will, if anything,
increase. 13
The observation that the financial services industry is
merely a vertical application of a much larger information
technology sector is essential to an appreciation of the
vulnerability of securities to technological change. Consider, for
example, the process of clearance and settlement.' 4 It was once
an intensely physical process employing small armies of
11 As SEC Director of Enforcement Richard H. Walker explained, "[w]hat used
to require a network of professional promoters and brokers, banks of telephones and
months to accomplish can now be done in minutes by a single person using the
Internet and a home computer." SEC Continues Nationwide Crackdown Against
Internet Fraud, Charging 33 Companies and Individuals With Fraud For
Manipulating Microcap Stocks, Exchange Act Release No. 2000-124 (Sept. 6, 2000),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-124.txt.
12 MIPS, short for million instructions per second, is a measure of the
computing power needed to compress a voice signal for compression over a high-
speed broadband network. See Nathan Stratton, Integrated Voice and Broadband
Network, Nathan Stratton's Homepage, at http'/www.robotics.net/papers/integrated
voice.html (Dec. 6, 2000).
13 See, e.g., Virtual Rivals, THE ECONOMIST, May 20, 2000, at 1 (U.S. ed.)
(describing how the revolution in information technology is transforming the
financial services industry).
14 Clearance and settlement is the process by which securities trades, are
finalized. Under the SEC's current clearance and settlement rule, trades are given a
three-day grace period to clear. See SEC Raises Stakes on Trade Turnaround,
INVESTOR REL. BUs., Dec. 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8692751.
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messengers and runners, with clerks locked in cages in the
basements of tall, ominous-looking buildings, and armies of
messengers routing certificates from building to building.
Today, however, the vast majority of securities ownership
positions are documented in electronic book-entry form.15 When
a purchase or sale of a security takes place, the only physical
thing that happens is the transfer of bits and bytes of data
among databases. There are no messengers scurrying about
with certificates to be delivered. Hard disks whir and the
transfer is done. It's all information technology.
This purely electronic form of transaction strongly
differentiates the financial services sector from other forms of
commerce that, at the end of the day, require the movement of
physical things in order to achieve clearance and settlement.
For example, when you use the Internet to buy a book, to select
groceries, or to lease an automobile, an irreducible percentage of
the cost of the transaction arises from the need to move a
physical thing that does not exist in purely electronic form. The
book (unless it's an e-book) has to be mailed. The car has to be
shipped (there are no e-cars). The groceries have to be delivered
(got e-milk?). That need for physical movement places a very
important limit on the efficiencies that modern technology can
deliver to markets that engage in physical transactions. In
financial markets, however, those physical limits do not exist
because there is no physical thing to be delivered. The security
is, in and of itself, pure information just waiting to be processed.
Indeed, the cost savings potentially attributable to modern
technology make it perfectly reasonable to think of a world in
which brokers charge no commissions and transactions costs are
driven to their economic marginal cost-zero. In that world,
intermediaries will be paid for providing a host of ancillary
record keeping, advisory, and management services. It is a
world in which the economics of the brokerage business will look
much more like the money management and principal investing
business than a traditional wirehouse commission-based
business. This is not a very bold prediction because commission-
15 Book entry refers to a system of direct securities registration, allowing
investors to hold their shares in book form through transfer agents instead of
certificates. See id. (explaining that "[although many registered investors have
consented to 'book entry' records of their holdings, others still prefer to hold actual
share certificates").
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less trading already exists, and many major financial
institutions understand that they have to retool their strategies
in this direction.16
The securities markets are highly sensitive to the evolution
of technology for a second fundamental reason. The efficiency of
securities markets depends on the rapid incorporation of
information into securities prices, as well as on the evolution of
new mathematical techniques for calculating and implementing
inter-market arbitrage relationships. 17  Because rapid
information incorporation and mathematical advances are both
driven by technological progress, the means by which the
markets will estimate the value of individual securities will
change dramatically as technology evolves.
The speed with which markets learn new information is
highly sensitive to technological developments. The ability to
discover and implement ever more complex inter-market
arbitrage relationships also depends critically on technological
progress. Advances in mathematical techniques and the ability
to implement these techniques are also apparent in several new
financial strategies and products that can dramatically change
the investment process. For example, exchange traded funds are
possible only because information technology makes it
sufficiently cheap to implement arbitrage relationships that
allow these funds to track their target indexes very efficiently.' 8
The emergence of these funds on a retail basis may provide U.S.
investors with entirely new strategies for building and
maintaining investment portfolios.
Combining these observations leads to a straightforward
16 See Cassell Bryan-Low, Web Brokers Begin to Offer No-Commission Stock
Trades, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2000, at C1.
17 See John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy,
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 53, 55-56 (1995) (discussing the role of arbitrage in
efficient markets).
18 For general discussions of exchange traded funds, see Julie Allecta, Exchange
Traded Funds: WEBS, SPDRS, Diamonds, NASDAQ 100, Opals and Others, SE91
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 283 (2000) (explaining that exchange traded funds, or ETF's, "are
derivatives or baskets of securities that generally track a well-known index or
industry sector and at the same time, trade like a share of common stock"); Robert
S. Salomon Jr., The Virtues of ETFs, FORBES, October 2, 2000, at 206 (explaining
several advantages and disadvantages inherent in dealing with exchange traded
funds); Burton G. Malkiel, Investors Shouldn't Fear "Spiders," WALL ST. J., May 30,
2000, at A26 (describing the "enormous growth" and "unique advantages" offered by
ETF's).
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conclusion. Securities regulation is all about information
regulation. The information may represent news that moves
securities prices, ownership records, announcements of bids and
offers, new forms of instruments, or evidence of transactions. It
doesn't make a difference. At bottom, it's all about information
and the movement of bits and bytes. It follows that the SEC is
in the information regulation business whether it wants to be or
not.
Participants in the information technology business
understand that they cannot succeed unless they have an
informed view about where information technology stands today
and where it might evolve in the future. The SEC must have
such a view as well or it will become a passive reactor to
technological change and run an unnecessary risk of failure. In
order to develop an effective technology strategy, however, a
market participant must have a set of predictions about the
probable evolution of technology and develop a plan for adapting
to those anticipated changes.
In developing a technology strategy, it is important to
recognize that "doing nothing" can be an intelligent and optimal
regulatory approach. But an agency can find itself "doing
nothing" either out of: (a) ignorance, (b) indecision, or (c) as a
consequence of a rational plan. If an agency succeeds because it
has "done nothing" as a consequence of its own ignorance or
indecision, then it has been lucky. There is nothing wrong with
good luck, and I would certainly rather be lucky than smart.
Unfortunately, it's dangerous to build a strategy around good
luck.
Finally, when developing a technology strategy, it is
important to recognize that today's reasonable judgment can be
tomorrow's horrible blunder. Technology evolves rapidly. One of
the biggest mistakes a competitor or regulator can make is to
commit to a policy that is expensive to reverse or that allows for
little further growth or adaptation. Regulators have to learn to
keep technology options open. Consider the growth of the
Internet over the past five years. Very few people would have
come close in 1995 to predicting the growth of Internet
technology by 2000. Predicting the path of the Internet from the
year 2000 until the year 2005 is at least as difficult.
Accordingly, it would be very dangerous to build a regulatory
strategy that was overly sensitive to any set of predictions about
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technological progress, and it follows that flexibility and
reversibility are central values when it comes to designing a
technology strategy. Given a choice between a strategy that
maps out a relatively inflexible path for the future and one that
allows for the evolution of new options, the choice is easy-
flexibility should prevail.
II. FOUR REGULATORY APPROACHES TO TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE
Regulatory agencies and legislators tend to adopt one of four
approaches when confronted with the prospect of technological
change. These approaches can be labeled as technology forcing,
proactive, reactive, or obstructionist.
Regulators and legislators are most obviously "technology-
forcing" when they adopt standards based upon technology that
does not exist at the time of their action. Technology-forcing
standards are designed to induce an industry to develop and
implement technology that would otherwise not be forthcoming,
or that would be implemented at a far slower pace. Automobile
efficiency standards are perhaps the best example of a
technology-forcing regulatory strategy. Effective adoption of
such strategies, however, requires a fairly good grasp of realistic
technological possibilities and of the realistic costs of achieving
the necessary technological breakthroughs on the timetable
mapped out by regulation. 19
19 For example, the 1970 Clean Air Act required automobile emissions to be
reduced by 90% in five years, despite the fact that Congress understood that "the
technology... did not yet exist, might not be available by the deadline, and had an
unknown cost." Eric Biber, Exploring Regulatory Options for Controlling the
Introduction of Non-Indigenous Species to the United States, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 375,
400 n.152 (1999) (quoting ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 842 (2d ed. 1996)). The requirements were finally met in 1981. See id.
Another example of technology forcing is the automobile airbag. The Department of
Transportation began to develop and implement standards for "passive occupant
restraint systems" in 1966, even though the technology was not yet available. See
Alan Heinrich, Karl Manheim & David J. Steele, At the Crossroads of Law and
Technology, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1035, 1036 n.1. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration ("NHTSA") historically engaged in very active technology-
forcing rulemaking, requiring improvements in auto safety that were in the
vanguard of current technology. The NHTSA has more recently moved toward a
reactive strategy of issuing recalls for safety defects. Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic
Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013,
1025 (2000) ("Because of difficulties with judicial review... NHTSA had problems
promulgating rules requiring safety improvements in cars and therefore shifted to a
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Proactive regulatory responses describe situations where
regulators do not force the market to develop technology more
quickly or in a different direction. Rather, proactive regulatory
responses rapidly adopt new technologies, promote the evolution
of technology in whatever direction the market determines, or
quickly adjust their regulatory regimes to recognize the
evolution of new technology. Government agencies that have
promptly and effectively built websites designed to take
advantage of Internet technology can be described as proactive.20
Research and development tax credits and other technology
incentives are also often described as proactive strategies. 21
Reactive technology responses describe situations in which
the marketplace has de facto adopted new technological
standards ahead of the regulatory regime, and the agency is
lagging the market it regulates. In this situation, the regulators
may find themselves applying regulatory standards that are
outmoded, or using technology that has been surpassed in the
private sector. The well-publicized technology problems
experienced by the IRS are an example of the difficulties of a
reactive approach. Indeed, the entire problem that the IRS
encounters when seeking to enforce the tax code against
sophisticated market participants who aggressively seek to use
financial technology to structure tax-avoidance transactions can
also be viewed as characteristic of a reactive stance to
technology.22
program of recalls for automobile defects."); see generally JERRY L. MASHAW &
DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 69-105 (1990) (documenting
the NHTSA's evolution from technology-forcing to passivity in its regulation of
automobile manufacturers).
20 The Treasury Department's Treasury Direct program, which allows any
individual to buy and hold treasury securities through the Internet without the
intermediation of a broker, is perhaps a good example of proactive government use
of technology. The Treasury Department has received a few good reviews for its
efforts to make its securities available to all investors over the Internet. See, e.g.,
Albert B. Crenshaw, U.S. Savings Bonds Go High-Tec; Securities Available On-Line,
Via Credit Card, 24 Hours a Day, WASH. POST, November 7, 1999, at H2.
21 Another example of a proactive regulatory approach to technology is recent
proposed legislation designed to support and encourage the use of digital signature
technology in electronic commerce. See generally Kalama M. Lui-Kwan, Recent
Developments in Digital Signature Legislation and Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 463 (1999).
22 IRS Commissioner Rossotti has himself acknowledged that the IRS is "really
an agency out of date." Heather B. Conoboy, A Wrong Step in the Right Direction:
The National Taxpayer Advocate and the 1998 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act,
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401, 1421 n.126 (1999-2000). For discussions of IRS
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Obstructionist responses result when regulators are either
overtly opposed to certain technological developments or are so
non-responsive that their inaction impedes the evolution of a
technology. The fact that an agency is obstructionist does not,
however, mean that the agency is wrong. New technological
developments are not always beneficial. If an agency forms the
view that a new technology presents a sufficient hazard then it
should actively seek to shut that technology down. For example,
if a new pharmaceutical or medical procedure has side effects
that are sufficiently serious when weighed against the
technology's benefits, then the Food and Drug Administration
would be correct to take regulatory action to block the use of that
new technology. On the other hand, obstructionist approaches to
technology can be self-defeating. The French approach to
regulating the Internet is a charming example of a
fundamentally obstructionist strategy doomed to the fate of an
electronic Maginot Line.23
While it may be possible to draw some crisp distinctions
between technology-forcing strategies and other strategies, there
are no bright lines that distinguish proactive strategies from
reactive strategies. There are also no bright lines that
distinguish between reactive and obstructionist strategies.
These are matters of degree. Moreover, because individual
agencies can confront a broad range of technological challenges
at the same time, an agency can simultaneously find itself
implementing technology-forcing strategies in some areas while
seeking to obstruct technology in others.
technological problems, see John Connor, Report Says IRS Modernization Plan
Suffers From Lack of Technical Skill, WALL ST. J., January 22, 1996, at B5
(summarizing National Research Council report which paints gloomy picture of
state of IRS efforts to modernize itself); Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Big Contract
Will Soon Be Awarded by the IRS, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Al; James J. Hall,
Critics Blast IRS' Tax System Modernization Program, WEST LEGAL NEWS (APRIL
12, 1996), 1996 WL 259761.
2 See Patrick Bishop, Jospin Calls for Internet Regulations, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), May 16, 2000, at 17 (explaining French Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin's position that self-regulation of the Internet cannot combat child
pornography and racism). One well-known instance of aggressive French regulation
of Internet content is a recent French court decision that prohibited Yahoo! from
allowing online sales of Nazi memorabilia through its U.S. auction site. The court
held that Yahoo! had offended the "collective memory" of France by permitting such
sales. See French Court Says Yahoo Broke Racial Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2000, at
C27.
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III. THE SEC'S HISTORIC APPROACH TO TECHNOLOGY
The SEC's track record in responding to technological
change may well be among the best of any federal agency to date.
That record is, however, far from perfect, and much can be
learned from the agency's shortcomings in dealing with
technology. Those shortcomings are attributable, I believe, to
two dominant factors.
First, the agency has never had a coherent technology
strategy. Although it is possible to point to situations when the
agency has been technology-forcing (EDGAR and decimalization
are two good examples), 24 it is easier to find situations where the
agency has been reactive or obstructionist because of an inability
to respond to new technological developments or because of a
fear of change, and not necessarily because of a conscious and
reasoned policy decision to defer a response. 25
Second, the agency's staff has lacked sufficient technological
expertise. Given the pace of technological progress and the
tremendous value that can be added by a neutral third-party
standard setter, there will likely be increased opportunities for
the agency to act in a beneficial technology-forcing role. Unless,
however, the agency adds a new set of technology skills to its
repertoire, it is unclear that it will be able to capitalize on this
opportunity. An agency dominated by lawyers and an occasional
economist may not have the necessary skill mix, and the time
may be ripe to add a core group of technologists to the agency's
staff.26
These two shortcomings are closely related and they create a
natural bias in favor of reactive and obstructionist strategies. If
there are few people in the agency who pay detailed attention to
the evolution of new technology and to its implications for the
markets, then it is all but inevitable that the agency will be
reactive or obstructionist because it does not know how to be
technology-forcing or proactive. This natural tendency will
24 See Wayne Upton, Financial Statements: Capitalizing on the Web's Power for
Financial Reporting, 1999 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 5 (1999), available at 1999 ABI JNL
LEXIS 5, *3; Henriqur de Azevedo Ferreira Franca, Legal Aspects of Internet
Securities Transactions, 5 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 4, 7 (1999).
25 See Upton, supra note 24, at *3.
26 For an example of the agency's lack of staff expertise, see Roberta S. Karmel,
Internet Prospectus Issues and Recent SEC Resolutions, N.Y. L.J., June 15, 2000, at
3 (suggesting that "the SEC may be forced to rethink its basic approach" to Internet
prospectuses).
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prevail even if the agency occasionally acts in a bold and
imaginative manner. Given that observation, it is interesting to
consider one of the most technology-forcing events in the SEC's
history and its fate since its inception. The tale is worth telling
because it is a timely example of how a technology-forcing
strategy can, due to forces that may well have been beyond
anyone's control, morph into a reactive or even obstructive
strategy.
EDGAR is the biggest technology bet ever made directly by
the SEC.27 When first conceptualized by SEC Chairman John
Shad in the mid-1980's, EDGAR was clearly a technology-forcing
strategy. The underlying vision was to replace the mountains of
paper that flowed through the SEC with an electronic filing and
dissemination system that would facilitate the registrant's filing
obligations. The same system would also ease the staffs review
process and facilitate the public's prompt access to information.
To achieve this objective, the agency mandated that certain
filings would have to be submitted electronically or not at all.28
Given the technology available at the time, and in light of
serious budgetary constraints, the agency developed a strategy
that relied on a centralized database with preferential
information access provided to the contractors who built the
database. 29 The contractors received preferential access to help
them recoup their development and operational costs. The result
today is a legacy system that seriously lags available technology.
While the system is quite functional, it is but a pale shadow of
the system that could be designed and built from scratch today.30
To be fair, no one in the mid-1980's could have predicted the
rapid advance of Internet technology in the 1990's. It would
therefore be wrong to criticize the agency for having failed to
predict a future that no one else was able to predict with any
confidence at that time. Further, there is probably little doubt
27 See generally John Penhollow, EDGAR, 960 PLYCORP. 33 (1996) (outlining
detailed history, compliance procedures, and analysis of EDGAR system).
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 For general discussions of the SEC's ongoing efforts to modernize EDGAR,
see Rulemaking for EDGAR System, 2000 SEC LEXIS 799, SEC Release Nos. 33-
7855, 33-42712, 35-27172, 39-2384, IC-24400 (April 24, 2000); Rule Changes
Adopted in EDGAR Modernization Effort, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 569 (May 1,
2000); EDGAR News: Upcoming SEC Plans for EDGAR, at http://www.sec.gov/
edaux1news/edplan2.htm (last modified Oct. 18, 2000).
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that the agency is better off today with the EDGAR system-
flaws and all-than without it.31 Nonetheless, the agency has
failed to update the system as quickly as it might in order to help
the system adapt and respond to changed technology.3 2 The
EDGAR experience thus stands as a testament to both the
potential value of intelligently applied technology-forcing
regimes and to the dangers of regimes that are insufficiently
flexible and adaptive. Given the rapid pace of future
technological developments and the potential benefits of
technology-forcing approaches, the EDGAR experience may well
have lessons that reach far beyond the registration system's
narrow domain.
IV. PREDICTIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND POTENTIAL
AGENCY RESPONSES
To this point, my observations about the SEC's approach to
technology have been abstract and exhortative. I have suggested
that technology poses the greatest challenge to the agency's
success, that the agency needs a technology strategy together
with a staff that contains more technologically inclined
personnel, and that the future will present increased
opportunities for technology-forcing strategies. That is all well
and good; however, the rubber doesn't hit the road until someone
presents specific examples of how a technology strategy might
influence the agency's actions and the markets it regulates.
Toward that objective, I present five distinct areas of
securities regulation related to technology and present specific
recommendations and predictions with respect to each.
A. EDGAR Should be Redesigned as an Open Architecture
System
As previously discussed, EDGAR is today a legacy system
based on outdated technology.3 3 The Commission should re-
31 See Upton, supra note 24, at *3.
32 For an example of criticism of even the most recent and most "web-friendly"
version of EDGAR, see Cary Griffith, The Modernized Edgarlink Proves to Be
Anything But, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 2000, at 22.
33 EDGAR has been criticized for being years behind schedule, millions of
dollars over budget, and devoid of effective top management to oversee the system.
See SEC System Shows Need for Upgrades, USA TODAY, March 4, 1996, at 2B
(reporting a congressional study that "the EDGAR system needs more flexible
computer 'architecture' to keep pace with technology and market developments");
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invent EDGAR and replace it with an open architecture system34
that provides improved service to users, filers, and to the staff.
This open architecture system could also save the government
millions of dollars that are currently spent operating the EDGAR
system as currently configured.
One possible implementation of an open-architecture "new-
EDGAR" system would be as follows. The SEC begins by
defining Designated EDGAR Filing Sites ("DEFS"). DEFS would
be operated by private entities and would have to satisfy
physical and electronic security and performance standards
established by the SEC. DEFS would be subject to third party
audit compliance procedures implemented by the SEC staff or
others to ensure that they comply with the SEC's security,
authentication, time-stamping, and other standards. DEFS
could also be required to post bond or provide other assurances of
responsibility and viability. There would be no limit on the
number of DEFS that could be established and any entity that
satisfies the SEC's standards could be qualified as a DEFS.
Filers would transmit their filings to any DEFS that the
filer selects. The DEFS site receiving the filing would be able to
charge a fee. The fee would be determined by competitive
market forces and would reflect the quality of the service offered
by the DEFS over and above the minimum standards set by the
SEC. The filing could be made immediately available to the
public upon receipt by a DEFS, and a copy could be transmitted
to the SEC for storage in the SEC's master database of filed
materials. Alternatively, the filing could be "embargoed" until a
copy was received at the SEC's database and the DEFS received
electronic notification of the agency's receipt, as well as SEC
authorization to release the filing to the public. As a technical
matter, it would not be necessary for the SEC to maintain such a
database, but the agency might insist on having the electronic
equivalent of its own "physical copy." To prevent fragmentation
of the public filing database, every DEFS would have the right to
sweep all other DEFS in order to copy filings made at other
GAO and Dingell Find SEC's Answers for Delay in Completion of EDGAR
Unacceptable, SEC. WK., Feb. 8, 1993, at 4.
34 Open architecture systems are assembled with industry-standard equipment
supplied by several vendors; whereas proprietary systems are not based on industry
standards and are supplied by a single vendor. See Deborah Novachick, Strategies
for Automation Management and Staffing, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 12, 1991, at 19.
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DEFS, and every DEFS would have an obligation to notify all
other DEFS of filings made on its system. Such sweeps and real-
time notifications would allow competitors to build multiple
complete and competing filing databases. These filings could use
the latest technological advances, including video, audio, and the
most recent forms of XML tagging, 5 if they complied with the
agency's minimum performance standards and did not generate
incompatibilities among DEFS.
The DEFS would neither require nor receive financial
support from the SEC for providing their services. The agency's
expenditures on new-EDGAR could then be reduced to: (1) the
cost of defining the performance standards that govern DEFS
operations (which would be minimal and comparable to a
rulemaking process); (2) the cost of inspecting DEFS to ensure
compliance (a function that could be outsourced, if so desired);
and (3) the cost of operating a database that simply mirrors the
filings posted to DEFS, and that could be ready to operate as the
"DEFS of last resort" in the event that the competitive
marketplace failed to develop. Costs could be lowered further by
relying on the filings made at DEFS without replicating the
highly authenticated information that would reside in DEFS'
sites. That would, however, eliminate the agency's ability to act
as "DEFS of last resort," and might be viewed as an overly
extensive reliance on outside contractors.
A similar structure currently exists in the Northern District
of California, where Local Rule 23-2 requires that certain filings
in class action securities fraud cases be posted on the Internet at
"Designated Internet Sites;" these sites are self-certified and
satisfy court-established performance criteria.36
35 For an explanation of XML tagging, see infra note 37.
36 Rule 23-2, entitled "Electronic Posting of Certain Documents Filed in Private
Securities Actions" states:
(a) Electronic Posting. All postable documents, as defined in subsection (b)
of this rule, required to be filed pursuant to Civil L.R. 5-1 in any private
civil action containing a claim governed by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995),
must be timely posted at a Designated Internet Site. The party or other
person filing such document is responsible for timely posting.
(b) Postable Documents. For purposes of this Rule, "postable documents"
means:
(1) Any pleading specified in FRCivP 7(a);
(2) Any briefs, declarations or affidavits filed pursuant to FRCivP 12, 41 or
56;
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(3) Any briefs, declarations or affidavits relating to certification of a class
pursuant to FRCivP 23;
(4) Any briefs, declarations or affidavits relating to designation of a lead
plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3) or 78u-4(a)(3);
(5) Any report, statement, declaration or affidavit of an expert witness
designated to testify, whether filed pursuant to FRCivP 26(a)(2)(B), or
otherwise;
(6) Any pretrial conference statement pursuant to Civil L.R. 16-10, pretrial
briefs or motions in limine;
(7) Any filing concerning approval of a settlement of the action; and
(8) Any filing concerning any request for attorney fees or costs.
(9) Provided however, that no person shall be required by this Rule to post
any:
(A) Document which is filed under seal with the written consent of the
Court, whether pursuant to a pre-existing written confidentiality order, or
otherwise; or
(B) Exhibits, appendixes or other attachments to documents otherwise
required to be posted; or
(C) Briefs, declarations or affidavits which are not available in electronic
form in the possession, custody or control of the person filing the
document, or such person's counsel, agents, consultants or employees.
(c) Timely Posting. A postable document shall be deemed timely posted at a
Designated Internet Site in accordance with subsection (a) of this rule if,
on the day the document is filed with this Court:
(1) An electronic form of the filing, prepared in any commonly used word
processing format, is forwarded to a Designated Internet Site by electronic
transmission, e-mail, physical delivery of a diskette, or any other means
acceptable to that Designated Internet Site, provided that such electronic
delivery occurs by means reasonably calculated to result in delivery by the
third day following the filing; and
(2) The certificate of service required by Civil L.R. 5-6 states that service in
compliance with this rule has been accomplished to a Designated Internet
Site that is identified by its physical and electronic addresses.
(d) Designated Internet Site. "Designated Internet Site" for purposes of
this rule means an Internet site that:
(1) Is accessible at no cost to all members of the public who are otherwise
able to access the Internet through commonly used web browsers;
(2) Charges no fee to any party, intervenor, amicus or other person subject
to the provisions of this rule;
(3) Places no restrictions on any person's ability to copy or to download,
free of charge, any materials posted on the site pursuant to the
requirements of this rule;
(4) Maintains and responsibly operates a notification feature whereby any
member of the public can request to receive e-mail notification, at no
charge, of any posting of materials to the Designated Internet Site;
(5) Undertakes to post on its site within two days of receipt of the
electronic copy all filings forwarded to it;
(6) Undertakes to provide e-mail notification within one day of receipt of
the electronic copy to all other Designated Internet Sites informing them of
the posting of any materials related to securities class action litigation;
(7) Maintains and publicizes a physical address to which the United States
Postal Service or other commonly used delivery services can make physical
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B. The SEC Should Adopt a Technology-Forcing Approach to
XML
"XML" is shorthand for extensible mark-up language. It
describes a technique for the consistent tagging of information so
as to allow the construction of larger databases that provide for
"apples-to-apples" comparisons. 37 For example, if "reserves for
doubtful accounts"38 were consistently tagged in all financial
delivery of documents, and/or diskettes, an Internet address in the form of
an operational Uniform Resource Location ("URL"), and an e-mail address
to which persons subject to paragraph (a) of this rule can transmit
electronic copies of documents subject to the posting requirement of this
rule;
(8) Undertakes to disclose prominently the URLs, physical addresses, and
facsimile numbers of all other Designated Internet Sites known to it; and
(9) Submits to the Secretary of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "Secretary") a statement signed by a member of the bar that: identifies
the Designated Internet Site through its URL; provides the name, address,
telephone number, facsimile number and e-mail address of one or more
persons responsible for operation of the site; and attests that the site
satisfies the requirements of the rule and that it will promptly notify the
Secretary should it cease to be a Designated Internet Site.
(e) Suspension of Posting Requirements. Compliance with this rule is not
required for any document filed at any time during which no Designated
Internet Site is operational
CIV. L.R. 23-2 (N.D.Cal.), available at http://www.securities.stanford.edu/pslra/ndcal
/locrules.html; see also Sylvia L. Sironi, Securities Regulation: Information Initiative
on the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 255, 256-57 (1998) (arguing that the Northern
District's Local Rule 23-2 "effectively advances the goals of the Reform Act" and
provides "collateral benefits as an excellent informational tool for practitioners,
legislators, and investors").
37 XML is perhaps most easily understood as an improved and more powerful
relative of HTML ("Hypertext Markup Language"), the language used to create Web
pages. Because XML, unlike HTML, is extensible, it is possible to define different
versions of XML for use with different kinds of documents. A specialized version of
XM1L for SEC filings would allow given pieces of text in the filing to be
unambiguously specified. For example, XML could specify that the words "Morgan
Stanley" at the bottom of the prospectus cover page refer to the name of the lead
underwriter. Users would then be able to search a database of SEC filings for
documents where Morgan Stanley is the lead underwriter, and the search will not
turn up any documents where the text "Morgan Stanley" appears in other contexts.
An XML-based filing standard would result in a more customizable and adaptable
search capability for a database of SEC filings. For discussions of the advantages of
XML-based electronic filing standards in both legal and administrative agency
contexts, see Robert Plotkin, Electronic Court Filing: Past, Present, and Future, 44
JUN B.B.J. 4 (2000); Claire Barliant, XML Revolution: Worth the Trouble, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at 30; Patent Office Turns to XML, INFO. WK., Oct. 9, 2000, at
40.
38 For a general discussion on reserves for doubtful accounts, see GEORGE S.
HILLS, THE LAW OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS § 2.6, at 70 (1957).
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statements filed with the SEC, then it would be easier to
construct larger databases that could be used to search for
companies with unusually high or low reserves, or that have
displayed unusual growth or decline in the size of their reserves.
The problem with XML is that it requires a central authority
(or an acceptable consensus mechanism) to establish a
"dictionary" or "grammar" that ensures that the same tag has
the same meaning in all applications. It is also important that
the tagging process remain dynamic so as to allow the creation of
new tags as novel circumstances arise, much as languages must
allow for the definition of new words.
Insofar as XML can be used in accounting statements and
SEC filings, the agency is the natural arbiter of a neutral XML
standard. There are several reasons why the SEC should step to
the plate to perform this role as quickly as possible.
The benefits of an SEC-standardized version of financial
account and reporting XML are significant. Users of financial
statements often strip those statements down and reconstruct
them in order to provide a representation of the registrant's
financial position that they believe is more meaningful than the
GAAP-consistent statements mandated by the SEC. 39 XML
would facilitate that process dramatically. XML could also allow
users to incorporate more readily into their view of the financial
statements-information that is now buried in the footnotes.
For example, if a user wanted to deduct information regarding
the estimated cost of option compensation for an issuer's
estimated earnings per share, XML would allow the user to do so
quite easily by simply extracting the tagged footnote data.
This last observation is fundamental. XML, if properly
deployed, would allow the market to divide the financial
reporting process into two distinct functions: (1) the accurate
measurement of data that are X1V[L tagged, and (2) the rules for
aggregating those data into financial statements. Because the
process of aggregating the data into alternate versions of income
statements, cash flow statements, and balance sheets would
become far cheaper and easier than it is today, the market would
likely evolve its own set of aggregation protocols. 40  These
39 See Bill Alpert, The Numbers Game: Reporting of Pro Forma Earnings is
Rising, and so is the Debate About It, BARRON'S, Sept. 11, 2000, at 22.
40 Other industries have attempted to use XML as well. See Lynda Radosevich,
Health Care Uses XML for Records, INFOWORLD, Aug. 25, 1997, available at
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protocols could co-exist with SEC and Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB") requirements, 41 thereby enhancing
the analysis process without requiring any material changes to
current forms of GAAP or GAAS. 42  Moreover, XML would
dramatically reduce the cost of allowing management to present
its own preferred view of its own financials, along with an
explanation of its views and, simultaneously, enhance the
market's ability to criticize management's self-assessment as
unrealistic. The evolution of XML tagging would therefore
greatly facilitate public understanding of managements' views of
issuers' financials and simultaneously promote the
dissemination of the views held by managements' critics.
If XML tagging is properly implemented, it could become a
significant boon to the agency's strategy of open and full
disclosure. XML would dramatically reduce the cost of building
alternative perspectives of any issuer's financial statements, and
promote a vigorous and robust market-based debate over the
proper approach to market valuation. Indeed, because XML
tagging is easily expanded to cover items that are not currently
captured in financial statements-such as measures of
intellectual capital, including the number of: patents issued,
engineers on staff, and eyeball views per month-an XML
approach would also be responsive to calls for expanding the
traditional approach to accounting and could be implemented
without abandoning the traditional approach.43 XML may thus
constitute the best "growth path" available to the agency when
dealing with the serious accounting issues it faces today.
http'//www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayStory.pl/features/970825xml. htm. For a
detailed explanation of how XML can be utilized, including its advantages and
disadvantages, see Winchell "Todd" Vincent, III, XML and the Legal Foundations
for Electronic Commerce: Legal XML and Standards for the Legal Industry, 53 SMU
L. REV. 1395 (2000).
41 For general background on the relationship between SEC and FACB
requirements, see Reid Anthony Muoio, An Independent Auditor's Suit for Wrongful
Discharge, 58 ALB. L. REV. 413, 419 (1994).
42 See Note, The Opinion Shopping Phenomenon: Corporate America's Search
for the Perfect Auditor, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1986) (discussing how GAAP
principles can be manipulated in order to please upper management).
43 A FASB-sponsored committee recently completed a two-year project studying
how investors and other users of financial information could get a broader, deeper
view of a company's operations by including nontraditional information in
companies' financial statements. See Steve Burkholder, FASB Panel Gives Tentative
Nod to Report Regarding Nontraditional Business Disclosure, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1312 (Sept. 25, 2000).
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C. The Challenges Presented by ECN Technology Can be
Addressed Through an Open API/Peer-to-Peer Strategy.
The fragmentation challenge posed by the emergence of
ECN's is one of the more contentious issues to face the agency in
recent memory. Technology created the ECN opportunity and
the fragmentation challenge. Technology can also help solve it.
The SEC should require that every exchange, marketplace,
ECN, and even every broker that crosses its own in-house
trades, be required to post its bid and ask information (to a
depth defined by the agency) at an electronically accessible
address structured to minimize system latency and designed to
offer prompt and executable information. These addresses would
be publicly posted in a readily accessible format. With such
information in hand, the market could develop a competitive
family of software-based search agents that would automatically
search for "best-execution"; however, that concept might be
defined by the search agent. Such software would resolve the
fragmentation issue by effectively reconstructing the fragmented
market into a single structured database so that investors can
compare prices among various markets to identify the best
location at which to attempt execution. 44
For example, suppose GM shares trade on the NYSE,
NASDAQ, three regional exchanges, and four ECN's. If the bid
and offer information, together with size available at all those
markets, were available on a real-time basis, then traders would
automatically be able to route their orders to the market that
they calculated would give them the best execution.
If the objective is to write a search agent that simply finds
the best bid or offer to execute a relatively small market order,
then the software task is simple. When trades involve larger
44 For a general discussion of the fragmentation controversy, see Ian
Springsteel & Michelle Celarier, The ECN Dilemma: Blasting Fragmentation, Wall
Street Calls For a Centralized Market Structure that Threatens the Upstarts,
INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, March 6, 2000. For discussions of NASDAQ's Super
Montage proposal, see Super Messy, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2000 (U.S. ed.)
(describing the battle between NASDAQ and ECN's and other Super Montage
opponents over SEC approval of Super Montage); Rachel Whitmer, Official Affirms
Decimal Readiness of NASDAQ Market 'When the SEC Wants It', 32 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 731 (June 5, 2000); NASDAQ Unveils New Order Display Window
Aimed at Centralization, Price Transparency, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1327
(Oct. 8, 1999); Bruce Kelly, Buy-siders Boo NASD: Fund Firms Question Super
Montage Plan, INVESTMENT NEWS, Sept. 11, 2000, at 1.
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blocks, seek to promote price improvement, or require more
demanding executions, then that task of writing a search agent
becomes more challenging and subject to interpretation-but
still possible.
D. Suitability Concerns Can Be Ameliorated Through Electronic
Warning Technology
The emergence of on-line electronic brokers poses a
challenge to traditional notions of suitability.45 Historically,
customers dealt with human brokers who often made
recommendations regarding specific instruments and strategies.
Because these brokers made recommendations, the SEC and the
SRO's were able to impose suitability obligations on the brokers.
Brokers thus stood as gatekeepers with potential liability for
"inappropriate" trading in a customer's account.46
In a world of electronic on-line brokerages, there are no
humans making recommendations, and electronic brokers
themselves avoid making the electronic equivalent of
recommendations. Instead, the brokers provide access to a wide
array of databases, news feeds, and search tools without
directing investors to any specific investment alternative. 47 In
this environment, electronic brokers are able to claim that they
make no recommendations, and thus have no suitability
obligations.
The SEC is nervous about this state of affairs. It is
concerned over the disappearance of an important "gatekeeper"
in the investment process: the professional regulated broker with
an affirmative obligation to "know the customer" and to
recommend only investments and strategies that are suitable to
the customer.48
45 See Online Brokerage Regulation Roundtable Set for November 1 in
Washington, D.C., PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 7, 1999 ("The suitability rule requires
brokers to recommend only those investments that are appropriate for a
client .... ").
46 See Unger Report Suggests Possible Rules on Best Execution, Systems
Capacity, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1563 (Dec. 3, 1999); Online Brokerage:
Keeping Apace of Cyberspace, at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/cybexsum.htm
(Nov. 22, 1999).
47 See Tracey Longo, Keeping Online In Line: Online Brokerages Say They're
Not Subject to Suitability Requirements, But Regulators May Argue Otherwise, FIN.
PLANNING, July 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7351388.
48 See id. (reporting Charles Schwab's position that "suitability obligations do
not apply to ... information typically available on Web sites").
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The difficulty with the traditional suitability doctrine in the
age of the Internet is that it is based on a critical assumption
that is simply untrue in the age of Internet trading. For many
investors, there is no one making a recommendation because
their orders are unsolicited and self-directed, and as to these
investors no one owes a suitability obligation. 49
If the SEC desires, it could address this situation not by
imposing suitability obligations on electronic brokers, but by
establishing appropriate "duty to warn" standards that could be
satisfied cheaply and efficiently through software tools that
analyze the investor's portfolio and trading history to offer
estimates (or "warnings") of the riskiness of the investor's
conduct. It would also be possible to calculate the marginal
effect of a proposed trade on a portfolio's risk level. The warning
generated by such software could also include estimates of the
probability that a portfolio would lose, say, 25, 50, or 75 percent
of its value over 6, 12, or 24 months. It could also compare the
riskiness of an individual trader's portfolio to broad market
measures of risk or to measures of risk inherent in other
accounts held at the same broker. No doubt, the agency would
want to assure that the warnings or estimates provided are
responsibly generated and neither understate nor overstate the
probable risk inherent in the investors' decision. A standard
rulemaking procedure should suffice in this regard.
Disclosure of such information, without the imposition of
liability for a trader's unsolicited transactions (especially after a
reasonably calculated warning), probably constitutes a prudent
accommodation of agency and industry concerns. The agency
and industry would be pleased that investors are being
cautioned about the consequences of their actions and that they
are receiving objective warnings that are not provided today.
The industry would be comforted that it would not have liability
for their customer's unsolicited - but warned - trading activity.
49 See Prepared Statement of Prof. Howard M. Friedman University of Toledo
College of Law Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent
Investigations Subcommittee, FED. NEWS SERVICE, March 22, 1999 (discussing
suitability obligations and online trading).
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E. The SEC Can Foster The Use Of Authentication Technologies
To Deter False Announcements That "Spoof' Legitimate
News Releases
The shares of Emulex, Lucent, and Pairgain have all been
subject to material stock price moves because imposters posted
false press releases to the Internet.50 These imposters typically
use techniques designed to mimic legitimate issuer releases. 5'
Similar frauds also occurred prior to the advent of the Internet,
but the general impression is that the Internet makes such
frauds more probable and more significant once they occur.52
The most recent such event involves Emulex, and the facts
of that transaction serve as a reasonable benchmark for
discussion. The perpetrator was a former employee of Internet
Wire.53 He used his knowledge of internal corporate procedures
to fool Internet Wire into believing that a bogus press release was
authentic.54 The press release falsely claimed that Emulex's
CEO had resigned, that the company was under investigation by
the SEC, that it would restate its 1998 and 1999 earnings, and
that it would revise its fourth quarter gain to show a loss.5 5 Dow
Jones News Service, Bloomberg, CNBC, and other financial news
outlets redistributed the false press release.5 6 Emulex's stock
price "plunged from $103 to $45 in 15 minutes," stripping more
than $2 billion from the company's market valuation before the
NASDAQ halted trading.57 The company then issued a release
asserting that its business was stronger than ever.58 The stock
closed at $105.75 down $7.31 on the day.59
60 See supra note 10.
51 See, e.g., Tezra Ewing et al., E-Mail Trail Leads to Emulex Hoax Suspect,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2000, at Cl; Alex Berenson, On Hair-Trigger Wall Street, A
Stock Plunges on Fake News, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2000, at Al.
52 See Corey Grice & Scott Ard, Hoax Briefly Shaves $2.5 Billion Off Emulex's
Market Cap, CNET (Aug. 25, 2000) (reporting the Internet has made it easier for
fraud to occur), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-2611957. html.
53 See Ewing et al., supra note 51.
54 See Corey Grice, 23-year-old Arrested in Emulex Hoax, CNET (Aug. 31,
2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-2660540.html.
55 See Ewing et al., supra note 10.
56 See Berenson, supra note 51.
57 See id.
58 See Emulex Rebuts Fictitious Press Release (Aug. 25, 2000) (company press
release) ("Emulex shareholders should be assured that our business is at record
levels and the fundamental of our business... have never been stronger."), at http:ll
www.emulex.com/press/2000/hoax.html.
59 See Berenson, supra note 51.
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The perpetrator held a losing short position in Emulex
shares and the fraud was designed to help the perpetrator cover
his short at a profit.60 The perpetrator apparently did so, and
sought to make additional profits by purchasing Emulex shares
while the stock was temporarily depressed.61
Recriminations flew even as the story developed. Competing
Internet services attacked Internet Wire for failing to check with
the company in order to confirm the accuracy of the press
release. 62 Internet Wire defended itself by explaining that it had
been victimized by a sophisticated fraud and that its competitors
had also suffered similar problems. 63  The press vacillated
between defending its own automatic redistribution of the story,
recognizing that it could have done a better job, and calling for
greater diligence before redistributing such materials. 64 The
NASDAQ market was criticized for failing to halt trading sooner
than it did.65
Finger pointing will accomplish little good here. It does not
take a high degree of sophistication to fool the current
distribution mechanism in the financial news cycle. It also does
not take a high degree of sophistication to conduct this sort of
fraud through techniques that make it very difficult, if not
impossible, for the authorities to identify the wrongdoer.
In the case of Emulex, the FBI was able to identify the
perpetrator easily and quickly because he used a computer
located close to the addressee and he did not invoke certain
measures available to mask his identity on the Internet.66 More
60 See Grice, supra note 54.
61 See id.
62 See Seth Sutel, Internet Wire Increasing Security Following Hoax,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 28, 2000), available at http://www/landfield.com/isn/mal-
archive/2000/ Aug/0159.html.
63 See id.
6 See Joseph Strupp, New Policies on Press Releases After Emulex, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER MARKET GUIDE (Sept. 12, 2000), available at http://www.mediainfo.com/
ephome/news/newshtm/stories/0912OOn2.htm.
65 See Thomas S. Mulligan, In Wake of Emulex Hoax, Blame Game Begins, LA.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, at C1.
66 Within hours, federal agents recovered the Internet Protocol number of the
computer where the fraudulent email originated, the IP number of the computer
used to create a Yahoo! email account to send the email, and the coding on the
Microsoft Word template used to design the false press release. All of these numbers
corresponded with computers at El Camino Community College, where the alleged
perpetrator was a student. The FBI also found records of the perpetrator's execution
of online trades in Emulex shares on his computer at his former job, the very wire
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talented perpetrators can use more advanced techniques to avoid
detection. For example, in my Law School classes at Stanford, I
often discover several computer literate law students who know
their way around the Internet well enough to be able to conduct
such a fraud-while making it far more difficult to identify them.
For obvious reasons, I will not explain these techniques in public
and simply observe that the entire structure of the news
dissemination process is currently quite susceptible to this sort
of fraud.
Significantly, however, just as technology is the source of
this problem, it also holds the key to the solution. Technology
currently exists that would allow issuers to post their news
releases to the Internet or to news services with an
authenticating mark.67 The "mark" would essentially serve as a
digital signature.68 That mark or signature would allow third
parties (the public, the press, and even the SEC) to verify with a
high degree of assurance that they are indeed viewing an
authentic document. Of course, if someone steals the code-
generating mechanism necessary to generate the mark in the
first instance, then the same fraud can be perpetrated with the
new technology. The odds of doing so successfully, however,
would be far lower than with today's authentication techniques.
We could, of course, wait for the market to determine that
this problem is sufficiently serious that news organizations
themselves decide to require the use of such authentication
technology. There may, however, be a collective action problem
with respect to standard-setting processes that impedes the rate
service (Internet Wire) to which he sent the fake release. See Christian Berthelsen,
Tracking Tech Crime: Law Enforcement's Cybersleuths Study Computer
'Fingerprints' to Crack Fraud Cases, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 3, 2000, at Bi; Andrew
Gumbel, Digital Footprints Lead FBI to Door of Trader Accused of $50M Fraud, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 12.
67 See Mark Gibbs, IP Security: Keeping Your Business Private, NETWORK
WORLD, March 15, 1999, at 36.
68 Technically, a digital signature is a message encrypted by means of public
key encryption and a hash function that allows a recipient who possesses the
signer's public key to determine: (1) whether the encryption was created with the
signer's private key, and (2) whether the initial message has been altered. The
additional step of ensuring that any given pair of public and private keys actually
corresponds with the designated individual requires a Certification Authority, who
acts as a repository of public keys and can issue an electronic certificate confirming
the connection between a given public key and a corresponding individual. See W.
Everett Lupton, Comment, The Digital Signature: Your Identity By the Numbers, 6
RICH. J. L. & TECH. 10 (1999), at http://www.richmond.edu/jolttv6i2/note2.html.
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at which organizations adopt this technology, if they adopt it at
all. Further, to the extent that the SEC, the NYSE, and
NASDAQ independently place a higher-than-free-market value
on the ability to authenticate such information in an egalitarian
manner, those organizations may have an incentive to adopt a
technology-forcing strategy that requires certain press releases
be posted to the Internet using an appropriate authentication
technology.
CONCLUSION
The future of the securities industry depends more on the
evolution of information technology than on any other factor. To
date, the Securities and Exchange Commission has done a
commendable job in responding to the challenges posed by
technology, but significant room for improvement remains.
In particular, the Commission lacks a coherent technology
strategy. It has no articulated view as to the likely evolution of
information technology or its effects on the United States'
securities markets. Nor does it have a stated perspective as to
the implications of technological progress for the Commission's
regulatory responsibilities. The Commission also has relatively
few technologists on its staff.
These observations are all related. Absent a Commission
that perceives technology as both a potential challenge to the
regulatory process, and as a potential solution to a wide range of
regulatory issues, the Commission will be unable to craft an
effective and coherent technology strategy for the regulation of
the nation's securities markets.
The Commission has, instead, approached technological
challenges on a case-by-case basis. The advantages of a case-by-
case approach are as clear as its limitations. A case-by-case
approach presents the agency with a series of well-defined
problems that are susceptible to discrete resolution. It also,
however, limits the agency's ability to plan ahead of the curve
and sharply curtails its capacity to harness technology as a force
that can provide more fundamental solutions to many of the
problems that challenge the nation's markets.
This brief Article has, I hope, provided some insight into the
potential benefit that can result from a more technologically
aware SEC. A more technologically aware approach would, I
believe, understand how EDGAR could be restructured to
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provide improved service at lower cost. It would appreciate the
potential benefits of XML as a solution to some of the most
vexatious accounting issues that plague the industry today. It
would understand the potential of "peer-to-peer" style networks
as a solution to the fragmentation issues that will continue to
roil the markets as technology evolves and as new entrants
compete for existing order flow. It would seek to harness
technology in providing a potential solution to suitability and
other risk disclosure concerns in modern, fast paced markets
where investors often have portfolios spread over many accounts.
And, it would recognize the ability of authentication technology
to provide a level of protection against certain forms of fraud
that are becoming more common in modern markets.
Absent internal institutional evolution of the form described
in this essay, it remains an open question as to whether, when,
and how these changes in the nation's securities markets can or
will emerge.
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